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 PAYGO FOR PUNCTUALITY 
Luke Fowler* 
 
ABSTRACT.  The federal budgeting process is wrought with conflict that makes 
it nearly impossible for the budget to be passed on time, or so it seems.  One 
aspect overlooked is the effects of statutory Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) rules.  The 
cursory evidence indicates PAYGO may be beneficial under certain 
circumstances.  The analysis relies on an Autoregressive-Moving-Average 
(ARMA) time series model with data from appropriations bills signed into law 
from fiscal years 1994 to 2014.  The findings indicate mixed effects for PAYGO 
statutes with a shorter budgeting timeline under the Budget Enforcement Act 
of 1990, but a longer timeline under the Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010.  
Additional findings suggest substantive relationships between the length of 
the budgeting process and party polarization, presidential leadership, and the 
economy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the Clinton administration, the federal government has 
experienced three government shutdowns, in which neither a budget 
nor a continuing resolution was in place to authorize continued 
government spending into the new fiscal year.1  On other the hand, 
during the same time period, there have only been two years in which 
the federal budget was passed in its entirety before the beginning of 
the fiscal year.2  Clearly, the federal budgeting process is wrought with 
conflict that makes it nearly impossible for the budget to be passed on 
time, or so it seems.  Furthermore, state governments have 
experienced some of the same strife in adopting budgets over the last 
two decades.  Thus, scholars have begun to take notice and focus on 
fiscal gridlock in recent years (Klarner, Phillips, & Muckler, 2010,  
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2012; Cummins, 2012).  Their questions are substantively focused on 
the causes of legislative gridlock in the budgeting process, and findings 
have added depth to understanding the dynamics of the legislative 
process.  Thus, the factors in the process which lead to a longer or 
shorter budgeting timeline are ripe for further analysis and additional 
hypotheses.   
Nevertheless, one aspect overlooked is the effects of statutory Pay-
As-You-Go (PAYGO) rules.  There have essentially been two eras of 
statutory PAYGO in contemporary Congressional budgeting: from 1990 
to 2002 under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), and from 2010 to 
the present under the Statutory PAYGO Act.  During the BEA PAYGO era, 
federal deficit levels decreased and a balanced budget was achieved.  
Thus, it has been contended that PAYGO was a watershed in managing 
federal debt levels.  However, this era also saw budgets passed on time 
and two government shutdowns.  During the latter era, federal deficits 
have been among their highest in history.  While they are arguably 
beginning to come under control, the data remain mixed.  Additionally, 
passing a budget in general has seemed a herculean task with the 
budgeting process stretching well into the next Congressional session, 
with the exception of the budget for the 2010 fiscal year which was 
finished by December.  What remains to be determined is: how have 
PAYGO rules affected the capacity of Congress to pass a budget on 
time?  The cursory evidence indicates PAYGO may be beneficial under 
certain circumstances. 
This article seeks to further explore that issue.  The analysis relies 
on an Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) time series model with 
data from appropriations bills signed into law for fiscal years 1994 to 
2014.  The findings indicate mixed effects for the PAYGO statutes with 
a shorter budgeting timeline under BEA PAYGO, but a longer timeline 
under the Statutory PAYGO Act.  Additional findings suggest 
substantive relationships between the length of the budgeting process 
and party polarization, presidential leadership, and the economy. 
PAYGO AND THE BUDGETING PROCESS 
 PAYGO adds a complicated dynamic to the budgeting process.  In 
general, PAYGO requires increases in expenditures or decreases in 
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revenue to be offset by other increases in revenue or decreases in 
spending.  The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 
sets out the modern framework of the federal process.  However, in the 
light of historic levels of deficits and debt, a new emphasis on 
balancing the budget was placed, making way for amendments to 
budgeting procedures.  The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (GRH), and later the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 
1987, placed new procedural rules surrounding deficits; namely, 
statutory limits each year.  However, by 1990, these procedural 
changes had garnered criticism for focusing too much on deficit control 
and not enough on spending control.  This was the impetus for the 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Congressional Research Service, 1990, 
2010a, 2011b; Doyle and McCaffrey, 1991).  According to Doyle and 
McCaffrey (1991, p. 28): 
In summary, the Budget Enforcement Act changes the impetus 
of GRH from deficit control to spending control within the 
context of a rising deficit, frees the Appropriations Committees 
from the threat of sequester arising from unforeseen economic 
events, and attempts to shift the focus of the budget process 
from a macro focus on the deficit number and the 
sequestration percentage to a more intermediate level. 
The BEA essentially marks the beginning of statutory PAYGO at the 
federal level.  Of the several changes adopted in 1990, two are of 
particular note: 1) the emphasis changed to limiting spending, not 
deficit growth; and, 2) discretionary appropriations were categorized 
into packages with specific spending targets and caps for each.  These 
two changes set the foundation of the approach of PAYGO, and also 
limited the context in which sequestration of spending occurs (Doyle 
and McCaffrey, 1991).  PAYGO relies on sequesters to control direct 
spending.  In budgetary terms, sequesters are triggers for automatic 
across-the-board cuts to programs once spending limitations have 
been reached within spending categories (Congressional Research 
Service, 1990, 2010a, 2011b; Doyle & McCaffrey, 1991).  That is, to 
control spending, once the statutory spending limits are reached for a 
spending category all programs are cut to keep spending from 
exceeded the statutory limit. 
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Enforcements of these mechanisms were ultimately the 
responsibility of the President, once the budget was being 
implemented, to control spending and ensure budget resolutions do 
not exceed the statutory limitations.  The formal procedures of the 
sequester mechanisms relied on the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget as the scorekeeper to report three times a year to Congress: 
with the President’s proposed budget, at the mid-session review of the 
budget, and a final report 15 days after Congress adjourned.  The first 
two reports were informational to Congress, so they could make 
adjustments in appropriations bills in anticipation of exceeding 
spending limits (Doyle & McCaffrey, 1991; Congressional Research 
Service, 2010a).  However, if the final report indicated the statutory 
limits were indeed violated, “the President was required to issue an 
order making across-the-board cuts of nonexempt spending programs 
within that category” (Congressional Research Service, 2010a, p. 4).  
However, “Congress was able to use points of order to enforce them as 
well” (Congressional Research Service, 2010a, p. 4).  These points of 
order were binding within the Congressional budgeting process, and 
were used to keep appropriations from violating limitations before the 
President was forced to order a sequester.  Congress was made aware 
of anticipated funding excesses and had available the opportunity and 
tools to circumvent reaching statutory limits (Congressional Research 
Service, 2010a, 2011b, 2013).  Thus, the PAYGO rules played into the 
Congressional budget process too, as Congressional leadership was 
apprehensive to allow sequestration to happen and cede 
programmatic funding control to the White House.  That is, when 
informed of an anticipated violation of spending limits, Congress could 
either work to reduce programmatic spending internally or allow the 
President to order across-the-board cuts, ultimately without 
Congressional input.  Congress, for the most part, remained pro-active 
and managed to reduce spending before the sequester order was 
necessary (Congressional Research Service, 2010a, 2011b, 2013).  
The BEA era of statutory PAYGO expired on October 1, 2002, at the end 
of the 2002 fiscal year (Congressional Research Service, 2010a).    
Although the statutory requirements of PAYGO expired, Congress 
still had the opportunities to use points of order established under the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to enforce spending limitations.  
However, these points of order can be waived under the rules of both 
chambers.  In the Senate, it requires a simple majority or 
supermajority, depending on the point of order; in the House, it 
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required special rules to be adopted by the chamber (Bradford & 
Scogin, 2008; Congressional Research Service, 2013).  In both cases, 
these rules only applied to Congressional budgeting and did not trigger 
any action from the President if spending limitations were violated.  
Furthermore, spending limitations could easily be waived during the 
process and without the consent from the president.  That is, with 
statutory limitations, the President has to sign legislation increasing 
spending limitations, but with chamber rules setting the limitations, 
expenditure ceilings could be raised with a simple majority vote 
(Congressional Research Service, 2007; Bradford & Scogin, 2008).  
Thus, PAYGO under Congressional rules did not have the binding power 
that statutory PAYGO carried.  This period of budgeting, though, was 
defined by the ‘Great Recession’ as much as any other factor as the 
U.S. experienced stagnation in economic growth and employment 
rates (Grusky, Western, & Wimer, 2011).  
On February 12, 2010, the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 
reestablished statutory PAYGO rules for the first time in almost a 
decade.  Like the previous era of PAYGO, it was designed to limit 
increases in the deficit caused by new direct spending or revenue 
legislation, through the use of sequestration mechanism 
(Congressional Research Service, 2010b).  Theoretically, this would be 
a return to the system established under the BEA, with no notable 
difference in the design for spending and deficit control.  However, the 
specific rules and spending limitations under the new PAYGO system 
were updated to address contemporary budgeting issues (See 
Congressional Research Service, 1990, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, and 
2011b for more details on the specific legislative differences between 
the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act).  The Budget Control Act of 2011 
further supported this by reinforcing discretionary spending caps and 
the sequester mechanism (Congressional Research Service, 2011a). 
Data on the outcome of the budgeting process indicates PAYGO 
had notable impacts.  Figure 1 displays the federal budget 
surplus/deficit in real dollars and as a ratio to gross domestic product 
(GDP) from fiscal years 1985 to 2014, with the eras of statutory PAYGO 
indicated.  As figure 1 indicates, BEA PAYGO was instrumental in 
bringing budget deficits under control.  With the peak coming during 
the late 1990s, when the federal budget resulted in a budget surplus.  
Following the expiration of statutory PAYGO at the end of 2002, budget 
deficits and debt remained relatively stable through 2007.  After 2007, 
270  FOWLER 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Budget Surplus/Deficit and Surplus/Deficit to GDP Ratio per Fiscal 
Year in Real (2009) Dollars:  1985 to 2014 
 
Note: From left to right, the first box indicates the BEA PAYGO era, and 
the second box indicates the Statutory PAYGO Act era.  
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014). 
 
there is a definitive period of growth that occurs in the deficit.  The 
Statutory PAYGO Act era, starting in 2010, again, sees the beginning of 
budget deficits and debt coming under control.  Note that these trends 
are heavily influenced by the economy, but there does appear to be a 
correlation between PAYGO and reductions in the federal budget 
deficit. 
Figure 2 displays the federal expenditures in real (2009) dollars 
and as a ratio to GDP from fiscal years 1985 to 2014, with the eras of 
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statutory PAYGO indicated.  Trends for the real dollars of expenditures 
indicate a stable, marginal increase over time until 2007; however, by 
2014, there are marked inclines in this trend.  On the other hand, the 
expenditures to GDP ratio bring these trends into a little more 
perspective, as expenditures naturally increase over time.  This ratio 
indicates expenditures were reduced during BEA PAYGO, but began to 
climb again after its expiration.  However, in the Statutory PAYGO Act 
era, expenditures appear to be coming under control.  Nevertheless, 
the true impacts of the Statutory PAYGO Act on deficits may remain to 
be seen for some time, as these new statutory rules have only been in 
effect for a few years.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Federal Expenditures (in billions) and Expenditures to GDP Ratio per 
Fiscal Year in Real (2009) Dollars: 1985 to 2014 
 
Note: From left to right, the first box indicates the BEA PAYGO era, and 
the second box indicates the Statutory PAYGO Act era.  
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014). 
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Table 1 presents a further comparison of deficits and expenditures 
across the budgetary eras.  Across the board, there are three 
noteworthy trends.  First, the era in which deficits and expenditures 
saw the greatest reduction was during the BEA PAYGO era.  Second, 
budgeting after the expiration of BEA PAYGO era saw an explosion of 
deficits and expenditures, reversing the trends from the previous two 
decades.  Finally, the Statutory PAYGO Act appears to have resulted in 
marked increases in all these indicators as well.  These figures 
considered together indicate PAYGO has an important impact on the 
outcome of the federal budgeting process.  These charts also may 
indicate there is a different relationship for BEA era compared to the 
Statutory PAYGO Act era; however, that difference may dissipate over 
time.  The effects on deficit and expenditure reductions are fairly 
obvious to ascertain, given that is the direct aim of the PAYGO rules.  
However, the timing of the budget may prove to be an externality, 
where the changing of the dynamics of budgetary negotiations has 
impacted the pace at which appropriations bills proceed through the 
budgetary process.   
 
TABLE 1 
Comparisons of Average Fiscal Year Deficits and Expenditures across 
Budgeting Eras 
Budget Rules Era Deficit (in 
Billions, 
Real 2009 
dollars) 
Deficit to 
GDP Ratio 
Expenditures 
(in Billions, 
Real 2009 
Dollars) 
Expenditures 
to GDP Ratio 
Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (1985-
1990) 
-322.6 -3.7 1844.3 21.2 
Budget Enforcement 
Act (1991-2003) 
-139.7 -1.4 2170.8 19.4 
Congressional 
rules/Non-statutory 
PAYGO (2003-2010) 
-628.9 -4.3 2987.2 20.7 
Statutory PAYGO Act 
(2011-2014) 
-844.7 -5.6 3334.2 21.7 
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014). 
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Figure 3 provides a comparison of the timeline for appropriations 
bills from fiscal years 1991 to 2014.  The figure displays the date the 
president signed into the law the first appropriations bill, the last 
appropriations bill, and the median date of all appropriations bills for 
each fiscal year.3 This comparison provides a cursory look at the 
budgeting timeline for each fiscal year, with the eras of PAYGO 
indicated.  The average date of the first appropriations bill passed 
during fiscal years with statutory PAYGO was October 15; the average 
median date for appropriations bills, November 21; and, the average 
date for the last appropriations bill, December 17.  For fiscal years 
within the intermediary non-PAYGO era, the average date for the first 
appropriations date was October 14; the average median date for 
appropriations bills, November 15; and, the average date for the last 
appropriations bill, January 19.  The basic comparison of dates does 
indicate that the budgetary process as whole ended earlier under 
 
FIGURE 3 
Date First, Median, and Last Appropriations Bills Were Signed into 
Law by President by Fiscal Year: FY1991 to 2014 
 
Note: From left to right, the first box indicates the BEA PAYGO era, and 
the second box indicates the Statutory PAYGO Act era.  
Source: U.S. Library of Congress (2014). 
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PAYGO, even though this is not a trend that seems to stretch across all 
appropriations bills.   
However, the charts do indicate that the effects under the BEA and 
the Statutory PAYGO Act seem to be different.  When separated into 
two eras, the average date for the first appropriations bill for BEA 
PAYGO was September 2; the average median date for appropriations 
bills, October 22; and, the average date for the last appropriations bill 
was November 25.  On the other hand, the average date for the first 
appropriations bill for the Statutory PAYGO Act era was February 19; 
the average median date for appropriations bills was February 20; and, 
the average date for the last appropriations bill was February 21.  
When separated, the results certainly indicate PAYGO is having some 
effect on the budgeting timeline, with BEA era resulting in earlier 
appropriations bills than both the intermediary PAYGO era of the 
2000’s and the Statutory PAYGO Act era. 
Why would PAYGO affect the timeline of appropriations bills, 
though?  PAYGO, at its heart, is a symptom of fiscal discipline 
associated with political regimes.  This in turn represents a different 
status quo associated with the budget negotiation process.  Namely, it 
places hard and fast restrictions on spending and deficits both 
procedurally and as a goal.  This provides an additional obstacle for 
budgetary actors to grapple with as they put together a financing plan 
for the federal government.  Therefore, it affects the speed at which 
the process may occur.  However, this may play out as a positive or a 
negative effect.  If it is a negative effect (meaning PAYGO decreases 
the length of the budgetary process), it suggests that PAYGO rules limit 
options, focus goals, and limit conflict.  Fiscal gridlock (discussed more 
below) is the primary result of conflict from budgetary actors.  Much of 
this conflict is the result of trying to create agreement when there are 
potentially infinite alternatives available.  That is, when there are an 
infinite number of options in distributing resources, deciding between 
those options becomes very difficult.  Every actor can develop their own 
preference for that distribution with little overlap or agreement 
between actors.  However, when the number of potential options is 
greatly reduced, agreement becomes easier.  That is, when there are 
very strict rules surrounding the distribution of resources, it is much 
easier to find agreement because the alternatives for doing so are 
more easily compared.  There are only a finite number of alternatives 
which creates much more overlap in the preferences for budgetary 
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actors.  Based on the cursory look at the dates of appropriation bill 
signings, it is likely BEA PAYGO was conducive to this experience.   
 On the other hand, if PAYGO has a positive effect (meaning PAYGO 
increases the length of the budgetary process), it suggests that 
budgeting actors are unwilling to compromise within the restrictions 
set.  That is, PAYGO not only limits options, it also limits the ability to 
satisfy all interests. Without spending or deficit control, every “pet 
project” can be funded; every interest can be given resources without 
consideration of the overarching financial consequences.  If the ability 
to satisfy all interests is limited and budgeting actors refuse to 
compromise, the process may come to a standstill.  That is, when the 
spending cap is reached, if the benefactors of program A and program 
B both become entrenched in their position, a stalemate is likely to 
result.  Even in the circumstances in which one benefactor can exert 
political capital to see their program win, the process of doing so slows 
down the timeline of the budgeting process.  Based on the cursory look 
at the dates of appropriation bill signings, it is likely PAYGO under the 
Statutory PAYGO Act is conducive to this experience.  While there is 
little evidence from previous scholarship to indicate why these 
separate trends exist, it is likely the result of the focus on fiscal 
discipline associated with the PAYGO eras.  As discussed below, fiscal 
gridlock has been of interest to scholars for some time, but few have 
ventured into looking at the causes of late budgets and none have 
focused specifically on PAYGO.  Nevertheless, both theory and the 
cursory evidence presented in the previous figures indicate PAYGO 
affects the budgeting process and those affects likely impact the 
timeline of appropriations bills.  Therefore, there is a need to 
investigate further this phenomenon. 
FISCAL GRIDLOCK 
There is a litany of other potential political and economic factors 
which contribute to gridlock, though.  Previous scholarship has 
identified party polarization and divided government, presidential 
leadership, and economics among other things.  The favorite target of 
scholars researching gridlock has been divided government for some 
time, with numerous researchers finding that divided government has 
an important effect on both the passage of legislation and fiscal 
outcomes (Mayhew, 1991; Alt & Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994; 
Clingermayer & Wood, 1995; Bohn & Inman, 1996; Clarke, 1998; 
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Binder, 1999; Conley, 2002; Anderson, Lassen, & Nielsen, 2012; 
Klarner, Phillips, & Muckler, 2010; Kousser, 2010).  Researchers have 
continued to develop their findings and further challenge the 
understanding of inter-party dynamics in the legislative process (Kelly, 
1993; Binder, 1999).  Understanding these findings, though, may 
depend on what is being measured, as Anderson, Lassen, and Nielsen 
(2012) and Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler (2010) both found divided 
government led to budgetary delays, but Gilligan and Matsusaka 
(1995; 2001) found little to no effects on state spending.   However, 
other scholars point to increasing party polarization as the culprit 
(Clarke, 1998; Binder, 1999; Masket, 2007), especially as it 
exacerbates the conflict between parties under divided government 
(Kousser, 2010; Cummins, 2012).  The understanding of the effects of 
divided government have evolved to take note of the increasing impact 
of party polarization, as the gap in ideological beliefs between parties 
has a substantive influence on inter-party dynamics.   
Party polarization has been a definitive trend over the last several 
decades, with several scholars noting it as well as the impacts it has 
had on the legislative process (for more detail on party polarization, 
see Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003; Theriault, 2006, 2008; 
Theriault & Rohde, 2011; Sorensen, 2014; Gray et al., 2015).  Scholars 
have measured these divisions in numerous ways including party votes 
(Coleman, 1997; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003), party unity 
scores, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores (Brewer, 
Mariani, & Stonecash, 2002; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003), 
and American Conservative Union (ACU) scores (Collie and Mason, 
2000).  Regardless of the measurement, though, the trends appear 
the same.  Furthermore, Woon and Anderson (2012) specifically 
analyze the political bargaining process for appropriations bills.  The 
findings indicate appropriations bills are not plagued by delays when 
ideological differences between leadership are minimized and 
distribution of appropriations is maximized.  In other words, as long as 
polarization is minimized by key players, the process moves forward.  
Alternatively, Hanson (2014) finds that majority party leadership is 
most likely to take measures to ease passage of appropriations bills 
when the majority party is ideologically divided, distant from the 
minority, or holding onto a thin margin of control.  In sum, the existing 
evidence indicates partisan and ideologically based conflicts can 
create gridlock in the legislative process.  Nevertheless, given the 
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previous research, it is expected that party polarization will have an 
impact on the budgeting timeline. 
As the budgeting process begins and ends with the president, his 
leadership throughout the process cannot be ignore.  Namely, 
presidential popularity (Canes-Wrone & de Marchi, 2002) and coalition 
building capacity (Weatherford, 1993; Peake, 2002) have been related 
to legislative success of his agenda.  To that effect, Anderson and 
Woon (2014) find the bargaining process for appropriations bill is 
heavily affected by the president’s position and his ability to negotiate 
with Congress.  Legislators are more likely to support the president 
when he is popular, as they can tie their electoral fates to him and use 
his support later to push their own agenda.  Furthermore, campaigning 
for Congressional elections can help build legislative support for 
Presidents after elections (Herrnson, Morris, & McTague, 2011).  
Additionally, not all presidents are equal in their ability to shape politics 
in Washington, or in their leadership ability.  Skowronek (1993) argues 
Presidents are elected in a political regime in which they must align 
with or fight against, and this shapes their ability to lead.  On the other 
hand, Barber (1985) contends Presidential character is defined by the 
energy he invests and his impression of his actions, which shapes his 
ability to effectively lead the nation.  Therefore, it cannot be expected 
that the budgeting process under all presidents is the same, when the 
political landscape and presidential character of the Commander-in-
Chief can differ significantly between administrations.  For instance, 
the last three administrations (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) have seen 
both different leadership styles and political landscapes.  Thus, it is 
expected that presidential leadership will have an impact on the 
budgeting timeline as well. 
Of course, the implications of economics on the legislative and 
budgeting processes cannot be ignored, especially considering the 
economic history of the period in question (Grusky, Western, & Wimer, 
2011).  The availability of resources is a source of conflict with any bill 
that requires funding, as it is in natural competition with all other 
sources.  Additionally, as the purpose of budgeting is determining how 
limited resources are to be distributed between competing interests 
(Key, 1940) it requires values to be measured in dollars creating 
conflict in itself.  At the federal level, two important indicators of 
availability of resources are economic growth and public debt.  
Economic growth suggests a growing tax base and more available 
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revenue.  While public debt can be measured in numerous ways and 
can likely have many implications, the simplest relationship may be 
that as borrowing increases Congress is more willing to rely on 
borrowed money to balance the budget, and thus seek more resources 
which will ameliorate conflict in funding programs.  In other words, as 
debt grows, Congress is likely more willing to rely on it to balance the 
budget; inversely, a decreasing debt would likely mean Congress has 
prioritized paying debt over spending in other areas, resulting in 
budgeting conflict.  During the Clinton administration, balancing the 
budget and reducing the debt were set as priorities causing money that 
would otherwise go to programs to be earmarked for those purposes, 
in turn reducing the potential resources to programs.  Alternatively, 
borrowing was heavily relied on during the Bush administration to fund 
the War on Terror, rather than create more conflict by balancing it 
against tax cuts and spending in other programs (Schick, 2007).  
Therefore, a growing economy and availability of borrowed money 
means more resources, reducing competition.  It is expected that both 
economic factors will have an important impact on the budgeting 
process.   
METHODOLOGY 
Data and Variables 
 Since the budget process is a process that is dynamic over time, 
an innovative dataset had to be created to capture the potential for 
variables that vary at different time intervals to affect the outcome of 
the process.  The first step was to determine the level of observation.  
As the budget process plays out over days, it was determined it was 
best suited to measure the data at this level.  Thus, the level of 
observation are days in the budgeting process.  Every observation is 
for a specific day in the budgeting timeline; these will be referred to as 
the observation dates.  It is assumed the budgeting timeline for each 
fiscal year begins on January 3 of each year as the beginning of the 
Congressional session; while this may vary slightly in some years, it 
creates an objective point of beginning for budgeting in each fiscal 
year.  There are two important considerations about this point to note 
though.  First, some initial budgeting events take place before this 
date.  For the purposes here, it is assumed that Congress as a whole 
does not focus on the next fiscal year’s budget until the session has 
started.  Second, in some years, the budgeting process continues into 
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the next Congressional session (i.e., a bill is not signed by the president 
by January 3).  In these cases, serial processing is assumed, not 
concurrent processing; so the budget process for the next fiscal year is 
not assumed to have started until after the previous one has been 
concluded.  To control for these effects, a dummy variable for those 
years is included for the fiscal year that the budget process has been 
stalled.  This controls for the potential effects of having the process 
delayed by the previous year’s budget.  
While this set of assumptions can be made about the beginning of 
the budgeting process, the end of the budget process is a little more 
difficult to pinpoint, as most years include numerous appropriations 
bills.  To effectively compare between years, the analysis will focus on 
three specific dates for the budgeting timeline for each fiscal year.  
These three dates are: the date the first appropriations bill was signed, 
the date the last appropriations bill was signed, and the median date 
for all appropriations bill signed that year.4 This essentially captures 
the effects for the first bill completed, the last bill completed, and the 
bills completed in between.  However, in some years, the same 
appropriations bill may fall into multiple categories (i.e., when a 
consolidated package is passed, rather than individual bills).  Figure 3 
(above) sums the distribution of dates for the passage of these bills.  
In sum, the budgeting process is assumed to last from January 3, with 
the noted exception, until the president signs the first and last 
appropriations bill, and the median date of all appropriations bills.  The 
date of the Presidential signing was obtained from the U.S. Library of 
Congress (2014) for each budget bill passed between 1993 and 2014. 
There is a certain limitation associated with only considering one 
bill at a time though.  Again, this assumes serial processing by the 
actors associated with each bill.  However, by focusing on the order of 
appropriations bills, rather than say the function of the bill, this does 
not make any other assumptions about how concurrent processing 
occurs for each bill.  That is, it is assumed the factors causing the last 
bill to be later than the first bill are the same every year and not a result 
of some functional category, which does not eliminate the effects of 
concurrent processing.  It just does not specifically include them as an 
analytical tool.  This is a noted limitation and is taken into consideration 
when developing conclusions. 
The final issue concerning the organization of the data is which 
fiscal years to include.  It was determined the budget processes for 
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Clinton, Bush, and Obama (to date) create a natural time period of 
comparison across the last three administrations.  Therefore, fiscal 
years 1994 to 2014 are included in the analysis; the dataset runs from 
January 3, 1993 to January 17, 2014.  In total this creates a dataset 
of 5866 observations days for the first appropriations bill, 6591 
observation days for the median appropriations bill, and 7243 
observation days for the last appropriation bill.  Note that if there are 
any days in between the date of signing for the appropriations bill and 
the start of the next Congressional session, those dates are not 
included in the dataset as they are not considered to have occurred 
during a budgeting timeline. 
With the data organized to analyze the dynamics of the budgeting 
process, the dependent variable has to be an objective measure of the 
outcome of that process in relation to time.  Thus, the dependent 
variable is measured as the number of days late the appropriations bill 
is.  That is, the budget process is “supposedly” to be completed by 
September 31 each year to fund the fiscal year beginning October 1.  
If the appropriations bill is not signed by October 1, it is late, leaving 
the government without a financing plan.  The number of days late is 
measured as the number of calendar days between the first, median, 
and last dates of presidential appropriations bill signings and October 
1 of the fiscal year that the appropriations bill is meant to fund.  Note 
the variable is measured as days late so late bills carry a positive sign 
while bills signed before October 1 would carry a negative sign (i.e., 
October 6 would be measured as 5, while September 26 would be 
measured as -5).  This dependent variable does not vary on a daily 
basis but remains constant for the entire budgeting process for that 
fiscal year.  However, this is corrected for with the statistical analysis 
technique outlined below, which is meant to correct for autocorrelation 
issues of this nature; it takes into consideration the relative 
relationship as it changes over time allowing for the dynamic nature to 
be captured.  That is, the statistical model takes into consideration how 
the changes in the independent variables over time affect the 
dependent variable, even though the dependent variable is constant, 
without violating statistical assumptions. 
 To control for the effect of PAYGO, dummy variables were used to 
compare different budgetary eras.  First, a simple dummy variable was 
used that compares only times with statutory PAYGO to times without 
it.  This would be the time period from the beginning of the dataset to 
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the expiration of BEA PAYGO at the end of the 2002 fiscal year, and 
beginning again with the signing of the Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010.  
Second, as a cursory look at deficits and the timing of appropriations 
bills indicate, the effects of BEA PAYGO and the Statutory PAYGO Act 
may not be the same.  Thus, an additional set of dummy variables is 
used to break these eras apart to determine if all PAYGO is created 
equally.  Data on the dates of PAYGO were obtained from the U.S. 
Library of Congress (2014). 
To control for the effects of party polarization, data from the ADA 
was utilized.  The ADA measures how often members of each party vote 
for selected legislation (See ADA (2015) for more information on these 
scores).5 The difference between the voting percentages for 
Republicans and Democrats on ADA selected legislation for each 
Congress was used to measure the ideological distance between 
parties in Congress (Brewer, Mariani, & Stonecash, 2002; Stonecash, 
Brewer, and Mariani, 2003).  To control for the effects of presidential 
leadership, dummy variables for presidency compare dates when 
Clinton or Bush (each with an individual dummy variable) were serving 
as president to dates when Obama was serving.  Data on dates of 
presidency was obtained from the White House website (White House, 
2014).  Note that the dummy variables for PAYGO, divided government, 
and presidential leadership vary at the daily level, as there are specific 
dates in which these begin and end. 
To control for economic trends, two variables were included: debt, 
and gross domestic product (GDP).   These variables fluctuate at 
different rates, based on the availability of information.  In the analysis, 
these fluctuations are consistent with the rate of fluctuation in reality, 
allowing for a modeling of effects based on the behavior of budgeting 
actors.  Debt fluctuates monthly, while GDP fluctuates at the quarterly 
level.  To code these, it was assumed debt numbers changed on the 
first day of every month and GDP numbers changed on the first day of 
every quarter.  Data on public debt and GDP was obtained from the 
Monthly Public Debt Statements from the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively (U.S. Treasury, 2014; BEA, 
2014). 
In addition to the previously mentioned dummy variable concerned 
with controlling for the effects of the budgetary process bleeding into 
the next Congressional session, a time variable is essential to control 
for effects of pressure to make statutory deadlines.  These two 
282  FOWLER 
 
variables will be referred to as the process control variables.  This time 
variable is measured as the number of days between the observation 
date and the date when a government shutdown will occur.  That is, 
the date at which the current appropriations legislation expires.  This 
measure is included for two reasons.  First, by using the number of 
days from the date of observation to the date of a government 
shutdown, it controls for the pressure associated with passing the 
budget on-time.   
Second, it, also, controls for the issue of time, by creating an 
objective comparison between observations throughout the process 
that may occur on different dates or process days, but have the same 
effect due to their relationship with the end of the process, which is the 
main interest here.  However, the date of government shutdown, or the 
date on which there must be a budget in place, can be moved, through 
the use of continuing resolutions.  To deal with this, as continuing 
resolutions are passed, the new effective date for the government 
shutdown is used to calculate the days until shutdown.  That is, if on 
September 15 there is no continuing resolution, the shutdown date is 
October 1 and the days until shutdown is calculated as 16 days; if on 
September 16 a continuing resolution is passed to providing funding 
until October 10, the days until shutdown is calculated as 29 days.  This 
allows objectively for the analysis to consider the effects of the 
predictors in relationship to how close or far away in time they were 
made to the actual presidential signing date.  Additionally, in the event 
the government did shutdown, days until shutdown was recorded as a 
negative number from the beginning date of the shutdown.  In this way, 
it is assumed that continuing resolutions do not reset the clock, but 
simply add more time to it.  That is, a continuing resolution is a 
treatment for the problem but not a cure; it provides more time and 
alleviates some pressure but pressure still remains.  This is a limitation 
in the research design.  However, this assumption best captures the 
length of time of the budgetary process as ending with a successful 
appropriations bill, compared to alternatives, which treat continuing 
resolutions as failures or ignore their implications all together.  Data on 
continuing resolutions was obtained from the U.S. Library of Congress 
(2014). 
Analysis Technique 
Initial data exploration indicated an autocorrelation issue that was 
beyond the capacity of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
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(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006; Graddy & Wang, 2008).6 Further data 
exploration7 suggested an Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) 
model was the best solution for fitting the statistical model to the 
causal model and available data (Hy & Woolscheid, 2008; Asteriou & 
Hall, 2011).  The autoregressive ARMA formula is defined as: 
 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐 +  ∑ 𝜑𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜀𝑡 
where, 𝑋𝑡 is a series, 1,…., p are parameters of the model, c is a 
constant, and t is white noise (Mills, 1990).   
ARMA is based on the work of Box and Jenkins (1970) and was 
developed for hypothesis testing in time-series analysis when there is 
a (weak) stationary stochastic process.  In contrast to OLS, the 
autoregressive aspect assumes the output variable is linearly 
dependent on its previous values, while the moving average controls 
for observations that lie outside the norm (Box & Jenkins, 1970; Mills, 
1990; Asterious & Hall, 2011).  This allows for the estimations of 
models in which outcome variables are highly dependent on their 
previous values (see Box & Jenkins, 1970; or Mills, 1990 for more 
details on ARMA estimation). 
Given the assumptions that the budgeting process is a stationary 
process that is only being affected by the changes in the political and 
economic environment, the ARMA model allows for the estimation of 
the effects of the environment on the process while considering the 
role previous values have in predicting the outcome variable, in this 
case the end of the budget process.  Additionally, the organization of 
the data assumes dependence between observation dates which is 
taken into consideration by the ARMA model.  Therefore, the ARMA 
model best matches statistical assumptions with theoretical 
assumptions and the available data.  In comparison to other analysis 
techniques, ARMA was chosen for its strengths in analyzing time-series 
data and its fit with the causal model.  The budgeting process, along 
with the data for this analysis, is well fitted within these assumptions.  
The Box and Jenkins (1970) methodology for model identification was 
employed (NIST/SEMATECH, 2014).  Review of the data distribution 
and initial testing of ARMA forms indicated that a non-seasonal random 
walk model best suits the data (see Mills, 1990 or NIST/SEMATECH, 
2014 for more details on identifying and fitting forms of ARMA).8 This 
special form is used to estimate the model here.  Further diagnostic 
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tests indicated the model was a good fit to the data, and no other 
assumptions were violated.   
RESULTS 
 Table 2 displays the results for the predictive models using the 
date of the first, median, and last dates for appropriation bill signings 
as the dependent variables, respectively.  For brevity and continuity, 
the results across all three dependent variables will be discussed 
together.  Note that in the discussion, models for each dependent 
variable are paired, with the first model in each pair including PAYGO 
and the process control dummy variables as well as the political and 
economic variables, and the second model in the pair only including 
the PAYGO and process control dummy variables to isolate the effects 
of PAYGO.   
First, Models 1 and 2, 5 and 6, and 9 and 10 show the results using 
both PAYGO eras pooled together for the first, median, and last 
appropriation bill dates, respectively.  While all models indicate that 
 
TABLE 2 
Results for First, Median, and Last Appropriations Bills as Dependent 
Variable 
First Bill Model 1* Model 2* Model 3* Model 4* 
-PAYGO 
(pooled) 
-BEA PAYGO 
-Statutory 
PAYGO Act 
-Bush 
-Clinton 
-Polarization 
-Debt 
-GDP 
-Days until 
Shutdown 
-Multi-session 
Budget 
-2.101 
 
- 
- 
 
-112.784* 
-30.836* 
-3.800* 
-7.77E-6* 
32.179* 
-.178* 
 
120.530* 
9.404* 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.295* 
 
120.60*** 
 
- 
 
-22.734* 
32.390* 
 
-113.663* 
-24.930*** 
-3.691* 
1.31E-5* 
33.516* 
-.178* 
 
121.321* 
- 
 
-28.484* 
73.679* 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.194* 
 
96.268* 
Constant 
Log L. 
-16.713 
-30586.56 
13.947 
-33616.36 
2.910 
-30557.99 
15.528 
-32789.1 
BIC 
N 
61259.24 
5501 
67276.1 
5866 
61210.73 
5501 
65630.27 
5866 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Median Bill Model 5* Model 6* Model 7* Model 8* 
-PAYGO 
(pooled) 
-BEA PAYGO 
-Statutory 
PAYGO Act 
-Bush 
-Clinton 
-Polarization 
-Debt 
-GDP 
-Days until 
Shutdown 
-Multi-session 
Budget 
-17.403* 
 
- 
- 
 
-86.355* 
-18.824*** 
-2.620* 
-4.10E-6*** 
18.213* 
-.102* 
 
91.926* 
5.781* 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.153* 
 
89.980* 
- 
 
-58.515* 
52.343* 
 
-91.816* 
-9.304 
-2.435* 
-1.52E-5* 
21.442* 
-.098* 
 
93.996* 
- 
 
-19.847* 
57.520* 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.106* 
 
69.365* 
Constant 
Log L. 
BIC 
N 
76.789 
-34319.21 
68725.79 
6226 
40.678 
-37002.91 
74049.78 
6591 
116.403 
-34181.69 
68459.49 
6226 
46.178 
-36389.69 
72832.13 
6591 
Last Bill Model 9* Model 10* Model 11* Model 12* 
-PAYGO 
(pooled) 
-BEA PAYGO 
-Statutory 
PAYGO Act 
-Bush 
-Clinton 
-Polarization 
-Debt 
-GDP 
-Days until 
Shutdown 
-Multi-session 
Budget 
-24.631* 
 
- 
- 
 
-38.618* 
6.866 
.693* 
-2.84E-6* 
8.826* 
-.007 
 
100.228* 
-6.663* 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.014** 
 
95.225* 
- 
 
-47.107* 
14.085** 
 
-43.33247* 
10.463*** 
.797*** 
-9.10E-6* 
10.731* 
-.004 
 
100.697* 
- 
 
-15.552* 
12.260* 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.003 
 
88.153* 
Constant 
Log L. 
BIC 
N 
-59.646 
-33201.82 
66492.01 
6877 
64.330 
-35601.86 
71248.15 
7242 
-36.113 
-33016.88 
66130.95 
6877 
66.909 
-35283.1 
70619.53 
7242 
Note: statistical significance ***>.05, **>.01, *>.001. 
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PAYGO does have a statistically significant relationship with each 
dependent variable, there is a change in direction of the substantive 
relationship as a result of the inclusion of political and economic 
variables that occurs in the models for the first and median dates, but 
not for the last appropriations bill date.  Initially, the results suggest 
PAYGO is having an effect on budgetary timelines, but that relationship 
warrants further inquiry. 
The more sophisticated modeling of PAYGO, though, sheds some 
additional light on the relationship.  Models 3 and 4, 7 and 8, and 11 
and 12 show the results using the PAYGO eras separated, rather than 
pooled, for the first, median, and last appropriation bill dates, 
respectively.  In this case, the results for both PAYGO dummy variables 
are consistent in both substantive and statistical relationships across 
all models, suggesting reliability.  The results indicate that under BEA 
PAYGO budgetary timelines tends to be shorter compared to the non-
statutory intermediate period, but under the Statutory PAYGO Act, 
budgetary timelines tend to be longer.  However, these findings do not 
consider the budgeting timeline prior to BEA PAYGO, so there is a 
notable limitation in the comparison.  Furthermore, the comparisons of 
the BIC scores across all twelve models for all three dependent 
variables indicate the strongest models are those that incorporate the 
separate PAYGO eras, rather than the models in which the two eras are 
pooled.  This suggests that the two forms of PAYGO are having different 
effects on the budgeting process and should be considered separately. 
Second, models 1 and 3, 5 and 7, and 9 and 11 show the results 
for the models which include control variables for political and 
economic conditions.  For all variables, the substantive and statistically 
significant relationship is consistent within dependent variables, with 
the exception of debt, Clinton, and party polarization, suggesting 
reliability for the mass of variables included.  In the case of Clinton and 
party polarization, the change in substance is between the first and 
median bills and the last bill.  This suggests a different relationship 
occurs towards the end of the budgeting cycle compared to earlier.  On 
the political side, the results indicate that party polarization 
consistently decreases the budgetary timeline in the process but 
increases the timeline late in the process. 
The results for the presidential variables indicate that the 
budgeting process under the Obama administration has been 
consistently longer than under the Bush and Clinton administrations, 
PAYGO FOR PUNCTUALITY 287 
 
 
except for the last bill for Clinton, when controlling for other political 
and economic variables.  However, the relative relationship between 
the Bush and Clinton administration differs when comparing the first 
appropriations bill date to the median and last appropriations bill 
dates.  These results indicate that while the budgeting timeline for the 
first appropriations bill tended to be shorter for the Clinton 
administration, it also tended to be longer for other appropriations bills.  
This suggests that there may be a high degree of variability within the 
budgeting process affected by which appropriations bill is being 
analyzed. 
On the economic side, the results indicate there is stability for the 
effects of GDP within dependent variables, but the effect changes 
direction when comparing the first and median appropriations bills to 
the last appropriations bill.  For the first and median appropriations bill 
dates, GDP has a negative relationship, meaning growth in GDP tends 
to reduce the budgeting timeline.  This suggests that budgeting during 
a weak economy is more difficult as resources contract.  However, for 
the last appropriations bill, GDP has a positive relationship, meaning 
GDP tends to have increased in the years when the budgeting timeline 
also increased.  On the other hand, the findings for debt are consistent 
in their statistical significance, but not in their directional relationship.  
As a whole, this indicates that debt has an impact on the budgeting 
process but the substance of that relationship is still undetermined.  
When the economic variables are considered together, the findings 
indicate the economy is having an impact on the budgeting process but 
that impact may vary depending on the specifics of the bills. 
Third, across all four models, the substantive and statistical results 
for the process control variables are stable within dependent variables, 
suggesting reliability.  However, days until shutdown experiences a 
change between variables as the direction of the relationship is 
different for the first and median bills compared to the last 
appropriation bill.  Given the lack of statistical significance, as well as 
the findings concerning the last appropriations bill, it is likely that by 
the time the last bill is being debated the threat of the process 
continuing is less of a deterrent to making compromise.  That is, early 
in the process budgeting actors may be willing to acquiesce in the 
interest of making deadlines, but by the time the last appropriations 
bill is being finalized continuing resolutions are the order of the day 
and the pressure to compromise has been dissipated as the deadline 
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is pushed in procedural votes.  The finding for the dummy variable 
concerned with the budgeting process bleeding into the next 
Congressional session is as expected. 
 Finally, as indicated above, the findings for the first and median 
appropriations bills differ from the findings for the last appropriations 
bill in a few notable places.  Taken as a whole, this suggests there is a 
different relationship happening late in the budgeting process than 
early.  Again, this is likely the result of the pressure associated with the 
beginning of the fiscal year and continuing resolutions that have less 
of an impact on compromises late in the process.  Additionally, the 
appropriations bills passed early on are likely to be the less 
controversial, compared to those passed last.  Thus, the last 
appropriations bills passed most likely are affected differently based 
on political and economic pressures than those passed early.  Across 
the board, the relationships appear consistent, but there is some 
notable variation that indicates timing in the process does change the 
effects, which supports the use of a times series analysis technique, 
and does offer insight into the process. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The direct implications of PAYGO rules clearly apply to spending 
control and deficit reduction, as a symptom of fiscal discipline.  
However, in the process of affecting those issues, PAYGO also changes 
the dynamics of the budget negotiation process as it signifies a political 
focus of leadership on fiscal discipline.  Statutory PAYGO reduces the 
number of options available for financing government, by placing 
enforceable rules around spending levels.  In practice, PAYGO changes 
the rules of the budgeting game, and as a result, has far reaching 
implications for its outcomes.  Furthermore, it represents a marked 
emphasis on fiscal discipline.  As the cursory evidence implies, 
spending and deficits came under control while the BEA was in effect 
and appear to be moving in the same direction under the Statutory 
PAYGO Act.  To the point of this article, though, there have also been 
important implications for timeliness of passing the budget.  The 
effects of PAYGO can either be positive or negative for the timeline of 
the budgeting process, depending on the reaction of budget actors.  If 
budget actors use the reduction of financing options as a means to find 
compromise, there is much more opportunity for agreement as options 
leading to disagreement are eliminated.  Therefore, the budget 
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negotiation process is simplified and the result is a shorter budgeting 
timeline.  On the other hand, if budget actors choose to become 
entrenched in their position in the face of reduced options, there is less 
opportunity for compromise.  The negotiation process enters a 
stalemate and fiscal gridlock is unavoidable.  The result, then, is a 
lengthened budgeting process. Based on results, it appears that 
PAYGO at the federal level has experience with both effects. 
 The findings indicate PAYGO is having an important impact on the 
budgeting process, but the relationship is notably different under the 
BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act.  This finding adds an interesting and 
sophisticated dynamic.  After reviewing the results and the existing 
literature, there are three possible explanations for the contradictory 
relationship that is occurring.  First, possibly the most obvious 
explanation is the role of party polarization.  Anecdotally, despite the 
government shutdown and the conflict between President Bill Clinton 
and Speaker Newt Gingrich, the Clinton era was a time of bipartisan 
agreement on fiscal issues between a Democratic president and a 
Republican Congress.  On the other hand, during the Obama era, there 
seems to be little common ground when the same partisan division of 
institutional control has occurred.  Additionally, the Obama 
administration has seen much larger intra-party polarization than the 
Clinton administration.  Scholarship on the subject does indicate that 
party polarization has increased since the early 1990s (Sinclair, 2006; 
Mann & Ornstein, 2012).   
 The statistical evidence indicates that party polarization actually 
shortens the timeline for the first and median appropriation bills, but 
leads to a lengthen timeline for the last bills.  This is likely a result of 
the increased controversy related to the appropriations bills signed at 
the end of the process compared to the beginning.  Additionally, during 
times of greater party polarization and conflict, omnibus appropriations 
packages are more common, so larger portions of the budget are 
determined at the end of the budgeting cycle.  This may create some 
limitations in the statistical analysis presented.  Nevertheless, the 
results indicate the less controversial bills at the beginning of the 
process are more quickly passed, most likely as party leadership are 
choosing their battles and focusing on the more controversial 
appropriations bills that take more time to pass.  With the more 
controversial appropriations bills, it is likely ideologies gaps both within 
and between parties have created such a conflict that both sides are 
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becoming entrenched in their positions rather than cooperating to 
achieve results, which is supported by previous research (Clarke, 
1998; Binder, 1999; Masket, 2007; Kousser, 2010; Cummins, 2012).  
The findings on the issues of inter- and intra-party polarization present 
a limitation to the findings here, and future research should continue 
to evaluate how partisan conflict effects fiscal gridlock. 
 Second, while PAYGO under the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act 
follow the same theory, there are some nuanced differences in the 
legislation about the specific rules, many of which are relative to 
entitlements and what constitutes PAYGO eligible bills (See 
Congressional Research Service, 1990, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, and 
2011b for more details on the specific legislative differences between 
the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act).  These may seem superficial, 
but they may also be the definitive difference in the effects on the 
budgeting timeline.  The legislative rules of the Statutory PAYGO Act 
may be so cumbersome to navigate that it leads to a lengthened 
budgeting timeline, compared to both the BEA and non-statutory 
intermediary PAYGO eras.  A cursory comparison of provisions does 
seem to support this (Congressional Research Service, 1990, 2010a, 
2010b, 2011a, 2011b).  However, while the specific rules can be 
examined, there is little means by which to test this explanation, as 
concluding from a content analysis that the Statutory PAYGO Act is a 
more complex piece of legislation than the BEA is not enough to 
establish causality.  Future research should consider the nuanced 
difference between the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act when 
evaluating the effects of PAYGO, and seek ways to test the effects of 
these differences to determine the most effective form of PAYGO. 
 Finally, possibly the simplest explanation, the Statutory PAYGO Act 
has only been in effect for a relatively short period of time.  Non-
statutory PAYGO was the order of the day for nearly a decade when the 
Statutory PAYGO Act was signed.  The Statutory PAYGO Act, though, has 
only been in use through four budgeting cycles.  Thus, the actors in the 
budgeting process have to have some time to learn the new system, as 
they have limited experience working with PAYGO under the new set of 
rules.  During that learning process, adopting a budget is likely to be a 
longer process, because there is less familiarity with the nuances.  
More importantly, though, they may need time to adjust to the renewed 
focus on fiscal discipline that is now being implemented.  During non-
statutory PAYGO, this emphasis faded, and budget actors must now 
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refocus their efforts to these goals.  As the data on expenditures and 
deficits indicate, the results are not flattering for the Statutory PAYGO 
Act when only the existing data is considered.  However, future trends 
may prove more positive, based on current projects from the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (2014).  While there are not long-term 
projections for the signing of appropriations bills, if this were to follow 
the same trend as expenditures and deficits, it is likely that the budget 
process would shorten over time as budgeting actors become more 
familiar with budgeting under the Statutory PAYGO Act.  Furthermore, 
the economic history of the period in question cannot be forgotten.  
Although, these events can be controlled for with GDP, those measures 
do not account for the larger political effects associated with ‘Great 
Recession’ and how they may impact budgeting.  Only time will tell if 
this explanation pans out, though.  Future research should continue to 
consider how the Statutory PAYGO Act is affecting the budgeting 
process, and how budgeting actors are learning to work under these 
new rules. 
The findings surrounding the political and economic factors are not 
particularly surprising and correspond, for the most part, with the 
extant literature on fiscal gridlock.  Party polarization, presidential 
leadership, and a weak economy all contribute to gridlock in budget 
negotiation process.  This is due to the political nature of the bargaining 
process and the availability of resources.  The inconsistencies that 
exist between and within models for the dependent variables, however, 
do indicate there may be a complexity to these relationships as well.  
This complexity is likely due to interactions that occur over time.  As the 
process control variables indicate, time does play a role in the process.  
That is, the magnitude of the effects of the predictor variables may 
fluctuate across the budgeting timeline as deadlines begin to 
approach.  The pressure to pass a budget only builds over time, so 
there is an interaction that occurs with the pressure from the political 
and economic factors.  In other words, a weak economy early in the 
process may have a less dramatic effect than a weak economy late in 
the process, or vice versa.  The same may be said for the magnitude 
for the relationships of divided government and presidential 
leadership.  Future research should explore the effects of the political 
and economic factors further while considering how the effects may 
fluctuate throughout the timeline.  Although some research has already 
been produced on this topic, there is certainly room for further insight 
and understanding about the exact nature of those relationships.   
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The findings here have two important implications for the practice 
of public budgeting.  First, and foremost, PAYGO can alleviate some of 
the conflict and complexity associated with the budgeting process, 
when used properly.  PAYGO rules may lead to a reduced number of 
financing options, but this reduces the complexity of the budgeting 
process.  Furthermore, this reduced number of options may result in a 
reduced number of issues on which to disagree.  With less 
disagreement and less complexity, comes a process that moves 
quicker.  Thus, PAYGO rules may be a suitable solution to public 
jurisdictions and organizations that find themselves in a malaise of 
fiscal gridlock.  Second, ‘when used properly’ is the operative phrase.  
Not all PAYGO rules are made equally.  When considering PAYGO, the 
specific design and implementation of the rules should be evaluated 
thoroughly.  As the comparison between the BEA and Statutory PAYGO 
Act eras indicates, PAYGO as a broad concept is not a magic bullet and 
does not lead to the same outcomes every time.  Future research 
should look deeper into the specific PAYGO mechanisms that do and 
do not work in practice to determine how best the budgeting process 
can be managed for results. 
NOTES 
1. November 13 to 19, 1995; December 15, 1995 to January 6, 
1996; and September 30 to October 17, 2013. 
2. Fiscal years 1995 and 1997. 
3. In the event there were more than one median date (i.e., even 
number of appropriations bills), the earlier date is included. In the 
event that one appropriations bill falls into more than one of these 
categories, it is included for all the categories it falls into for that 
fiscal year (i.e., one consolidated package passed for the entire 
fiscal year). 
4. In the case that there is more than one median date, the earlier 
date was identified. 
5. Data was unavailable for 112th Congress (2012). 
6. Use of the Prais-Winston correction did little to solve the problem, 
so it was concluded that a more sophisticated technique was 
necessary for the time-series analysis. 
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7. Several analysis techniques were considered, but ARMA was found 
to have the most applicable assumptions and to produce the most 
effective estimations based on diagnostic tests and residual 
variance. 
8. The graphical distribution of the outcome variable most closely 
matched that of the AR(1) distribution; testing of alternative forms 
of the ARMA model supported this conclusion based on diagnostic 
tests and residual variance.  The ARMA model form was specified 
based on 0 autoregressive term (p), 0 nonseasonal differences (d), 
and 0 lagged forecast errors (q). 
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